Goa's ST Reservation Act, 2025: Constitutional Correction or Constitutional Overreach?

The Constitutional Promise

Article 332 is not framed as an enabling provision. It is framed as a mandate.²

It provides that seats shall be reserved for Scheduled Tribes in the Legislative Assembly of every State. The constitutional objective is self-evident: meaningful political representation for historically disadvantaged communities within the democratic framework of State legislatures.

For decades, however, Goa occupied a peculiar constitutional position.

Although Scheduled Tribes were constitutionally entitled to representation, no Assembly constituency in Goa was reserved for Scheduled Tribes. This anomaly became increasingly significant after communities such as Kunbi, Gawda and Velip were included within the Scheduled Tribe list through statutory amendments following the 2001 Census.

The issue eventually reached the Bombay High Court at Goa in Shri Prasad Gaonkar v. Election Commission of India.⁴

The Court's observations are significant because they dispel a common misconception regarding the judgment.

The Court did not reject the constitutional entitlement of Scheduled Tribes to reservation. Quite the contrary.

There can be no doubt that as per the mandate of the Constitution, seats have to be reserved for Scheduled Tribes in the Legislative Assembly of the State.— Bombay High Court in Prasad Gaonkar

The Court further recorded that neither the Union of India nor the Election Commission disputed the constitutional mandate. The disagreement concerned the mechanism through which such reservation could be implemented.⁴

That distinction is critical.

The constitutional right was never the problem. The absence of a statutory pathway was.

Why the Petition Failed

The significance of Prasad Gaonkar lies not in what it rejected but in what it identified as the legal obstacle.

The Court noted that the Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order, 2008⁶ had already been issued pursuant to the Delimitation Act, 2002.⁵ That exercise was conducted on the basis of the 2001 Census, which remains the operative constitutional population base until publication of the figures of the first Census after 2026.³

Once the Delimitation Order attained finality, the Court found itself constrained by the constitutional and statutory framework governing delimitation.

The High Court therefore declined to issue a direction effectively rewriting the existing delimitation framework through judicial intervention.

In essence, the Court held that the problem could not be solved by judicial creativity. It required legislative action.

Three years later, Parliament supplied precisely that.

Parliament's Response

The long title of the 2025 Act reveals Parliament's legislative strategy.¹

The Act expressly seeks to facilitate reservation of seats in accordance with Article 332 and to address the consequences arising from the inclusion of additional communities within the Scheduled Tribe list after the 2001 Census.¹

The drafting technique employed by Parliament is particularly noteworthy.

The legislation does not rely upon the 2011 Census.

It does not rely upon any future Census.

It does not increase the number of Assembly seats.

Nor does it contemplate a statewide redrawing of territorial constituencies.

Instead, the Act consciously anchors itself to the 2001 Census.¹ The Census of 2001 continues to occupy constitutional significance because of the freeze introduced and subsequently extended through constitutional amendments, most notably the Constitution (Eighty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 2001.⁷

Thereafter, the Act authorises the Election Commission of India to amend the 2008 Delimitation Order while having regard to Articles 170 and 332,² the Delimitation Act, 2002⁵ and the provisions of the legislation itself.¹

The legislation is therefore structured as a targeted corrective measure rather than a comprehensive delimitation exercise.

Whether that characterisation survives constitutional scrutiny is another matter altogether.

The Constitutional Fault Line

The strongest challenge to the Act emerges from Article 170.³

Article 170 freezes the process of readjustment until the publication of the figures of the first Census after 2026. The constitutional freeze itself was extended through the Eighty-Fourth Amendment as part of a broader policy designed to avoid penalising States that had successfully implemented population control measures.⁷

A challenger is likely to argue that Parliament cannot achieve indirectly through ordinary legislation what the Constitution postpones directly.

The argument would proceed on a straightforward premise.

If amendment of the 2008 Delimitation Order alters representation prior to the constitutional timetable contemplated under Article 170, the exercise may amount to a form of prohibited pre-2026 readjustment, regardless of the label attached to it.⁸

The challenge becomes even more intriguing because Article 327 itself begins with the words "subject to the provisions of this Constitution".²

Consequently, Parliament's power to legislate regarding elections and delimitation cannot override constitutional limitations elsewhere in the constitutional scheme.

From this perspective, the 2025 Act may be viewed not as implementation of Article 332 but as circumvention of Article 170.

A Legislative Solution to a Constitutional Impasse

The defence of the legislation is equally compelling.

Supporters of the Act are likely to contend that Parliament is not overriding the Constitution at all.

Rather, Parliament is implementing it.

The argument rests upon several features of the legislation.

First, the Act does not abandon the constitutionally recognised population base. It remains anchored to the 2001 Census.¹

Secondly, it does not alter the number of Assembly seats.

Thirdly, it does not undertake a fresh statewide delimitation exercise.

Finally, the legislation seeks to address a specific anomaly created by the post-2001 inclusion of additional communities within the Scheduled Tribe list.

Viewed in this manner, the Act may be characterised as a limited constitutional correction designed to operationalise the already existing mandate of Article 332.²

The Government's likely position would be that Article 170 freezes general readjustment and delimitation, but does not prohibit Parliament from creating a narrowly tailored mechanism to fulfil another constitutional obligation.

That argument gains additional force from Article 327, which empowers Parliament to legislate with respect to elections, delimitation and all matters necessary for securing the due constitution of legislative bodies.² Provisions such as the Representation of the People Act, 1950⁹ stand as familiar examples of legislation enacted under that constitutional source.

The question, therefore, is whether the Act represents implementation or circumvention.

Reasonable constitutional lawyers may disagree.

A Question Larger Than Goa

The debate surrounding the Goa legislation is ultimately about far more than reservation.

It raises a fundamental question of constitutional interpretation.

What should courts do when two constitutional provisions appear to operate in tension with one another?

Should Article 170 be read strictly as an absolute prohibition?

Or should Articles 170 and 332 be harmonised in a manner that gives meaningful effect to both?²

Constitutional adjudication is often less about choosing one provision over another and more about preserving coherence within the constitutional structure as a whole.

The Goa legislation presents courts with precisely that challenge.

Indeed, one of the recurring themes in constitutional jurisprudence is that seemingly conflicting provisions must be interpreted harmoniously wherever possible. The challenge here is that both provisions advance important constitutional objectives, one seeks electoral stability and demographic neutrality, while the other seeks democratic representation.

The courts may therefore be required to determine not merely what Article 170 prohibits, but also what Article 332 demands.

The controversy today lies not in the existence of the constitutional entitlement, but in the means through which that entitlement may be realised.

Conclusion

The constitutional entitlement of Scheduled Tribes to representation in the Goa Legislative Assembly is no longer seriously disputed.

Indeed, Prasad Gaonkar itself acknowledged the mandate contained in Article 332.⁴

The controversy today lies elsewhere.

It lies in the means through which that mandate may be realised.

The 2025 Act¹ represents Parliament's attempt to bridge the gap identified by the Bombay High Court. Whether it is ultimately viewed as a constitutional correction or a constitutional overreach remains to be seen.

What is certain, however, is that the legislation has produced one of the most interesting constitutional questions in recent years.

Between Article 170's freeze on readjustment and Article 332's promise of representation² lies a constitutional space that Parliament has now attempted to occupy.

It will be fascinating to see how the constitutional courts navigate this apparent dichotomy, and whether they ultimately conclude that the Act gives effect to the Constitution, or ventures beyond its limits.